

Securing the Uptake and Producing Effect through illo-perlocutionary Speech Acts

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Abstract:

The illocutionary act of an utterance conducts effect on the receiver in different ways among which “securing the uptake” is one of the very important. Illocutionary acts are bound up with the effect through securing the uptake. Such an illocutionary effect is distinct from the perlocutionary effect. The context of the utterance, the shared background between the speakers and the listeners as well as the social conventions shared between the speaker and the receiver are the main basics for the listener to go beyond the literal meaning of the utterances and reach the embedded meaning encoded by the speaker through language.

Keywords:

Securing, uptake, speech acts, illocutionary act, perlocutionary act, meaning effect.

سرعة البديهة وإحداث التأثير من خلال أفعال الكلام

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الملخص:

يحدث الفعل الإنجازي في الخطاب تأثيرا على المتلقي بطرق مختلفة. ولعل أحد وجوه التأثير تلك "سرعة البديهة" التي تعد إحدى أهم تلك الطرق. ترتبط أفعال الإنجاز بعملية التأثير بشكل كبير عن طريق ما يعرف "بسرعة البديهة" ويختلف تأثير فعل الإنجاز عن تأثير فعل القول بشكل كبير؛ إذ إن سياق القول المأثور والخلفية المشتركة بين المتكلم والمتلقي، وكذا الأعراف المجتمعية المشتركة بينهما هي الأسس الرئيسية التي من شأنها أن تخول للمتلقي تجاوز المعنى الحرفي للقول والوصول إلى معنى المعنى؛ أو المعنى الضمني الذي يقصده المرسل من خلال ذلك القول المأثور.

الكلمات المفتاحية:

فعل القول، فعل الإنجاز، الخطاب، المتلقي، سرعة البديهة، التأثير، القول المأثور.

Logicians

اللغوي
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Introduction

Logicians and philosophers of language in the 1930's and 1940's emphasized the descriptive function of language. Language was considered to be used only for making statements; declarative sentences that describes events, facts, or states of affairs. Statements are verifiable as they can be either true or false. Nevertheless, not all the utterances that speakers produce are statements. There are exclamations, questions, orders, etc. These types of utterances are considered to be meaningless on the basis that they are not verifiable.

This descriptive and "emotive" approach to language was later to be rejected by linguists such as Wittgenstein who said that focus should not be on the meaning but on the use of words and expressions. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein (1958, p43) claims "***the meaning of a word is its use in the language***". He argues that "***one cannot guess how a word functions; one has to look at its use and learn from that***" (Ibid, p340)

The same view has been issued by medieval Arab rhetoricians as Al-jurjani (1981) who "emphasizes the importance of relating the functions to the Social contexts in which languages operate, insisting on the role of socio-rhetorical conventions in determining our socio-linguistic behaviour" (Al- jurjani in El-hakkouni 1995, p124).

The most influential challenge to the positivists view that the only fully meaningful utterances are statements, is due to Austin's (1971) theory of speech acts. Lyons said that "***one of the most attractive features of the theory of speech acts, which was introduced into the philosophy of language by J.L Austin, is that it gives explicit recognition to the social or interpersonal dimension of language behaviour***" (1977, p725). In his theory of speech acts, Austin distinguishes between two major types of utterances: "constatives", which subsume statements, are utterances that describe a fact or a state of affairs and which can be either true or false and "Performatives"; utterances which are meaningful but do not describe a fact or an event. "Performatives" cannot be true or false, they are either successful/ happy or unsuccessful/ unhappy. Saying something sometimes involves the performance of a particular act that Austin calls "a speech act". Austin defines performatives saying that "***the issuing of an utterance is the performing of an action-it is not normally thought of as just saying something***" (Austin 1962, pp6-7)

The distinction between "Performatives" and "constatives" is the cornerstone of the theory of speech acts and is relevant to the distinction between using language to say something and to do something. Lyons (1977, p727) observes that "***roughly speaking, we can say that the distinction between constative and performative utterances, as was originally drawn, rested upon the distinction between saying something and doing something by means of language***". Even in the class of "Performative" utterances, Austin distinguishes between three acts: the locutionary act, when we say something that has a sense and a reference, which is defined as "***the act of "saying something" in this full normal sense I call, is dub, the performance of a locutionary act'***" (Austin 1962, p94). The performance of a locutionary act implies the performance of an illocutionary act. That is, when we utter a sentence that has a sense and reference we utter it with a certain force. In saying something, we make our utterances carry a certain conventional force in order to request, inform, state, order, promise, etc. "***to perform a locutionary act is, in general,.....to perform an illocutionary act'***" (Austin 1962, p98). By saying something, the speaker may achieve an effect on the hearer. This effect is known as the perlocutionary act. And

by saying something, we may either request, invite, apologize, convince, persuade.... our audience. The perlocutionary act is defined as "**what we bring about or achieve by saying something**" (Austin 1962, p109). These three acts represent the three dimensions of the use of an utterance and language in general. These three dimensions are independent and distinct from one another, but at the same time, they are interrelated in the sense that by means of a locution we perform an illocutionary act. Or, as Austin put it, "**to perform an illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act: that, for example, to congratulate is necessarily to say certain words**" (Ibid, p114). For instance, you cannot promise without having produced a locution to the extent that you take the responsibility of doing something sometime or the other. Moreover, you intend to make your addressee understand that you are making a promise and you achieve an effect on him to the extent that you make him feel that you intend to fulfil your promise. For the time being, we shall focus on the distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act as far as "effect" is concerned. It is evident that the perlocutionary act is responsible for the production of effect, but the illocutionary act is also connected with the production of effect in certain senses. "**I must point out that the illocutionary act as distinct from the perlocutionary act is connected with the production of effects in certain senses**" (Austin 1962, p116).

In this article, we shall be concerned with the effect produced by the illocutionary act. We attempt to answer the question: In what sense can the illocutionary act produce an effect on the audience? Austin provided an answer this question and said that there are "**three senses in which effects can come in even with illocutionary acts, namely, securing uptake taking effect, and inviting responses**" (Austin 1962, p121). We shall focus on the first sense, namely, "the securing of uptake". So, what does to secure the "uptake" mean? To what extent are illocutionary acts bound up with effect through "securing of the uptake"? To what extent is the illocutionary effect distinct from the perlocutionary effect?

1. “Uptake” between medieval Arab Rhetoric and English pragmatics

"Uptake", "secure the uptake", and "be quick on the uptake" are the basic notions around which the present study is revolving. These are concepts pertaining to certain fundamental aspects of linguistic communication. The term "uptake" has been introduced into the field of pragmatics by Austin (1962) to explain how efficient linguistic communication is achieved between participants. Therefore, it is very important to define the concept “uptake” and the expressions “secure the uptake”, and "be quick on the uptake". It is also necessary to establish the basic terminology in order to determine the appropriate meaning of "uptake" in linguistic communication, in general, and in the theory of speech acts in particular. We are going to consider the different definitions of this term and attempt to select one single adequate definition that would be applicable to the various languages and cultures.

The Oxford Advanced Dictionary defines "uptake" as an idiomatic term associated with "understanding" in the sense that to be quick/ slow on "the uptake" is to be quick/slow to understand. The notion of Understanding is associated with the ability to derive meanings out of utterances or actions. Yet, this understanding is vague, in the sense that it may (not) require efforts depending on what is to be understood. We may overlook this problem if we consider the definition provided in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English that uptake is "*the ability to understand especially something new*".

Both definitions (Oxford and Longman) refer to “uptake” as what is not normally and overtly issued". It is the mental capacity of inferring meanings intended by speakers in issuing linguistic utterances. It is the sagacity and intelligence of the hearer to make assumptions and inferences from what is said or done. In this sense, "uptake" is synonymous to the Arabic terms "Fahm" and "idrâk". The English-Arabic dictionary Al-Mawrid as well as Elias's Modern dictionary share the same definition of "uptake" as "comprehension" and "discernment".

In our opinion, "uptake" can be translated in Arabic by the term "Al Badihah" which is defined in Lissan Al Arab dictionary as: "Ma yüfa ja? u bihi" (that which surprises). And we say about somebody that he is "sahibu badihatin" (one who has the presence of the uptake) when he is a person who says or does the right thing at first blush when he is surprised with it; (yosibu fi awwali ma yufaja? u bihi). Therefore, "surçatu Al-badi hah" (being quick on the uptake) is the result of "huðuru -l- badihah " (The presence of "uptake"). That is, being quick on the "uptake" is a sign of the presence of "uptake". As a matter of fact, we can conclude that "Al Badihah" is a feature of persons who are able to respond appropriately and instantly when they hear something new.

Louis Al-Maçlouf (1908) defines "uptake" as "**responding without taking a long time in thinking**". For a person to be quick on "the uptake", he/she should be able to respond pertinently and appropriately without thinking. In this respect, Ibn Manzur argues in his Lissan al Arab that we say "Badaha-r-rajulu ida ajaba jawaban Sadidan ça la-l- badihati" i.e. (He secures the "uptake" if he responds appropriately and pertinently. Thus, "uptake" means also "Al fitnah" (acumen) and "Al basirah" (sagacity).

As far as the English and the Arabic definitions of "uptake" are concerned, we notice that in Arabic, we have the verb baðaha, yabðahu, baðihatan, etc.; while in English the term "uptake" cannot be derived into a verb as "to uptake". In this respect, medieval Arab Rhetoricians, especially the scholar morphologist Ibn Jinni (1930), argued that when an expression is derived to a verb or a noun, it is assigned various meanings according to the use. Derivation facilitates the process of defining words and expressions. By contrast, when an expression is used simply as a noun or as a verb, it is kept powerful, and its meaning cannot be understood unless it is connected with another expression; as is the case of "uptake" and "secure". The two expressions "secure" and "uptake" collocate because "secure" means "succeed in getting something for which there is a great demand", what is demanding in "the securing of uptake" is the understanding of the speaker's meaning or what EL-HAKKOUNI (1995) calls "**the speaker's intended goal**". This intention is new to the hearer

but is not directly and overtly conveyed in the speaker's utterances. And the hearer duty is to secure this implicit goal.

Generally speaking, "uptake" means "understanding". "To secure the uptake" means "to understand something instantly"; "the securing of uptake" is "the intuitive, immediate and appropriate response". To be "quick on the uptake" is "to understand pretty quickly".

As mentioned above, "uptake" is a technical term that was initially used by Austin. It is very important to understand its meaning within the theory of speech acts. Austin (1962) said that illocutionary acts are sometimes performed indirectly: a speaker may suggest, request, order, etc. a hearer to do something without making the illocutionary force of his utterance clear. Searle (1975 b) argues that a speaker may simply hint at his illocutionary act which is primary through performing another secondary illocutionary act.

Take for instance:

(1) I have not eaten for two days.

In issuing this sentence, the speaker intends to perform an illocutionary act which he makes implicit. The speaker does not intend to state a fact or provide the hearer with information only, but also to make a request. The hearer is expected to secure "the uptake" in order to get the illocutionary force intended initially by the speaker. In other words, the hearer has to understand that the speaker is indirectly making a request.

The securing of "uptake" is a means for the hearer to work out the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterances when issued indirectly. The speaker may use language indirectly and non-conventionally to perform an illocutionary act and the hearer has to secure "the uptake" in order that he would be able to carry out the illocutionary force of the act performed. When a speaker says:

(2) Can you reach the salt?

He will succeed in performing an illocutionary act (e.g., request), but this illocutionary act cannot be carried out unless the hearer secures the "uptake" and understands the utterance as a request. Austin argues that "*we distinguished... three senses, in which effect can come in*

even with illocutionary acts, namely, securing uptake..." (1962, p131). That is, illocutionary acts are bound up with effect. But it is the perlocutionary act which is characterized with the producing of effect (cf. Austin, 1962: p118). This seems rather contradicting: following Austin, "*there cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means employed are conventional*" (1962, p119), and "*unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed*" (Ibid, p116).

Therefore, a speaker uses language conventionally to perform illocutionary acts; these illocutionary acts cannot be successful and happy unless the speaker manages to achieve an effect on the hearer. That is the case of illocutionary acts as advising, requesting, ordering, etc. as in (3) below,

(3) Get out of here!

The above statement is conventionally and directly intended to order the hearer to leave the place. It is conventional because it can be made explicit by inserting the performative formula. According to Austin (1962) all illocutionary acts are conventional, but sometimes the speaker uses language to persuade, convince, arouse and performs acts. This non-conventional use of language can also achieve an effect on the hearer. Thus, they are illocutionary acts that are non-conventional. concerning conventionality and intentionality in speech acts, Strawson says that we have to distinguish between the normal, serious use of language and the etiolated and parasitical use of language. Strawson (1964 a, p27) argued that "*some illocutionary acts are conventional, others are not*" and that "*Austin has made the simple mistake of generalizing from some cases to all*".

Consider the following example:

(4) That house is built in 1905

The speaker does not intend (4) simply as a statement; rather, he issues it to alarm the hearer to be careful and (possibly) not to dig deep near that house because it would collapse. The act of alarming is non-conventional; it cannot be made explicit. Alarming is the effect a speaker intends to

achieve. Therefore, it is an "*illocutionary effect*" (Searle 1979 b: 30), and the verb "alarm" is in fact "*an Illo-perlocutionary*" verb (c.f. EL-HAKKOUNI 1995, p134). The performing of the illocutionary act of (4) requires the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intended illocutionary force. i.e. the hearer's has to secure the "uptake". When the hearer understands the illocutionary act of an indirect utterance, he is said to have secured the "uptake", but sometimes he may fail to get it and thus we say that he does not secure the "uptake". Moreover, El Hakkouni (1995, p137) observes that "*the hearer may intentionally thwart the speaker's goal without actually appearing to be uncooperative, for instance, by exploiting some ambiguity, or simply, by feigning ignorance and stupidity*". In this study, we shall consider only cases where a hearer unintentionally succeeds/fails to get the speaker's intended illocutionary act. We shall also attempt to explain on what basis the hearer secures "the uptake".

Despite the differences, all the above definitions of "uptake" are complementary. They focus on defining "uptake" as "understanding" and "discernment". Consequently, securing the "uptake" is a property of the hearer; it is the hearer's mental capacity of inferring the speaker's intentions. To secure the "uptake" is to manage understanding what has been primarily intended by a speaker and for which the hearer lacks clear evidence. Somebody who is quick on the "uptake" is one who is quick-witted, astute, and acute.

2. The meaning of meaning and the basics for Securing the Uptake

There is a distinction, in the philosophy of language, between the literal meaning of an utterance (what a sentence or an expression means), and its intended meaning (what a speaker means when he utters it). This distinction is parallel to Al Jurjani's (1981) distinction between "meaning" and "meaning of meaning" in his theory of "maçna-l-maçna" (the meaning of meaning theory) about which El-Hakkouni (1995, p121) says that "*the eleventh-century grammarian and rhetorician, Al-Jurjani, operates, in his major work Dalail al-içjaz fi çilm al-maçani, an important distinction between "al- maçna" (meaning), which is equivalent to*

the lateral meaning of the uttered sentence (also called "Al-maḥna Al-lafzi li-ljumlah"), on the one hand, and "Maḥna Al-maḥna (meaning of meaning), which is equivalent to the speaker's intended meaning, on the other". The two types of meaning (meaning and meaning of meaning) are interrelated in the sense that the "meaning of meaning" of an utterance is understood by means of understanding first, its literal "meaning". El-Hakkouni analyses Al-Jurjani's (1981, p203) distinction between these two types of meaning when saying: "*in a nutshell, you say "meaning" and "meaning of meaning". By "meaning" you refer to what you understand directly from the words of the uttered sentence;...; and "meaning of meaning", you refer to another type of meaning the securing of which is partly dependant on, and mediated by, your understanding of the sentence meaning in context*" (Al-jurjani in El-hakkouni 1995, p126). Hence, El Hakkouni concludes that communication can be either direct or indirect.i.e. the speaker may utter a sentence and intends to mean its literal meaning, or he may mean something else in addition to this lateral meaning. That is what Searle means by saying that "*in uttering a sentence, a speaker may mean something different from what the sentence means, as in the case of metaphor, or he may mean the opposite of what the sentence means as in the case of irony, or he may mean what the sentence means, but mean something more as well, as in the case of conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts*" (Searle 1979b, p118) Therefore, the speaker's use of language is dependent on his "intended goal"

Consider the following utterance:

(1) The teacher is arriving.

At the first glance, we can understand (1) as a statement of fact that describes an event and which can be either true or false. But if (1) is related to the context where it is used, we will understand that it is a performative utterance. For instance, (1) can be said by a student to his classmate who is cheating in the day of the exam. Therefore, the speaker utters (1) to warn his addressee. The speaker performs an indirect speech act. As a consequence of the uttering of (1), the hearer will hide his papers and stop

cheating. The hearer's reaction implies that an effect is achieved on him. This effect is an **"illocutionary effect"** (Searle 1979 b, p30). We shall focus on the hearer's ability to decode the speaker's message, and how he understands that an illocutionary act has been performed; in other words, how an illocutionary effect can achieve a certain effect on the hearer. As a response to this, Austin (1962) said that the speaker secures "the uptake"; that is, he understands that an illocutionary act has been performed.

Following Lyons (1977, p731) definition of "uptake" as ***the addressee's recognition that a particular illocutionary act has been performed***, and taking into account that performing an illocutionary act is intentional, the hearer of (1) understands that the speaker is warning him. The hearer notices that the speaker is cooperative and understands that he is respecting the conversational maxims. So, the hearer will not focus only on the literal meaning of the utterance, but he will relate it to the current conditions (context) and thus understands the speaker's implied meaning. The context of the utterance helps the hearer to derive the speaker's intended meaning, and he will, as a response, stop cheating even though no sign in the speaker's words denote an order/request to stop cheating. The warning is simply understood from the context where the utterance is produced. About this understanding, Lyons explains that ***"understanding an utterance can be described as a cognitive response on the part of the receiver"*** (Lyons 1977, p732) and this cognitive response is what Austin (1962, p117) refers to as ***"securing uptake"***.

A speaker encodes his utterance with a set of illocutions. When the hearer receives the utterance, he understands what the speaker means; he understands the meaning of the utterance, recognizes the illocutionary acts performed by that particular utterance without any need to know the intentions of the speaker. Take, for instance, a speaker X and a receiver Y, Lyons says that ***"Y can know what X meant without knowing, or needing to know, why X said what he said "*** (1977, p736). The question then is on what basis the receiver secures "the uptake"? i.e. to what extent "to mean" and "to understand" collaborate to achieve effect on the receiver? The first thing to recognize is that "to mean" is on the

part of the speaker while "to understand" is related to the hearer. Therefore, we shall deal with situations of communication involving a speaker, a receiver, and a message.

In the previous section, we have argued that "securing the uptake" is used interchangeably with understanding and understanding is a faculty of the mind. Therefore, "securing the uptake" is a mental process which requires the presence of rational capacities. Thus, securing "the uptake" depends on the hearer's mind. i.e. it has to do with the degree of intelligence and acuteness of the hearer. A person cannot secure "the uptake" if he does not make use of his mental capacities. These mental capacities should be qualified in order that the person can derive the implied meaning of utterances. Thus, we can distinguish between persons who are quick on "the uptake" in the sense that they are able to make inferences and derive meanings from utterances, which are indirectly implied. And other people who lack this mental capacity; they are slow on "the uptake". So, the securing of "the uptake" is firstly detected from the hearer's intelligence as well as his wittiness and insight.

Back to example (1), the illocutionary act cannot be happily achieved unless the audience hears the locution, takes it into account, and understands the illocutionary force of the utterance. Strawson (1964a) says that the understanding of the illocutionary force of an utterance depends on the hearer, but it is intrigued by the speaker in the sense that to say something with a certain illocutionary force is at least to have a certain complex intention. That is, to issue utterances with more than one illocutionary force depends on how the sender's intention is to be understood.

What is intended is up to the speaker but the result is not. Therefore, Strawson (1964a) claims that what counts is not simply the speaker's intention to produce effect on the audience, but his intention to produce response by means of the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention to produce that response. Thus, an illocutionary act is achieved if and only if the receiver recognizes the force of the utterance. This recognition or securing of "the uptake" is related to the shared factual background between the speaker and the hearer.

In decoding the message of a speaker, the receiver refers to the knowledge that he has about that particular context wherein the utterance is issued. The hearer's mental capacities are very essential to detect the illocutionary act(s) performed in an utterance. Concerning the mental knowledge shared between participants, Shiffer (1972, p185) says that "***if it is mutual knowledge between A and B that C, then A knows that B knows that A knows...that C***". The hearer uses his mind and refers to the factual knowledge which he shares with the speaker to decode messages. The speaker himself communicates his ideas to the audience relying on this background which is, in turn, shared between him (the speaker) and his audience. Taking this shared knowledge into account, the speaker indirectly sends his message and encodes it with implications as in the case of indirect speech acts wherein "***the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and non-linguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer***" (Searle 1979, pp31-32). Therefore, there exists a kind of knowledge that both the speaker and the receiver share because they belong to the same speech community or geographical area or the same culture. Therefore, securing the "uptake" is secondly based on the mutually shared background between participants. This mutually shared background is referred to by the speaker in communicating his message and by the hearer in understanding and decoding that message.

Imagine a mother who looks out of the window and says to her daughter who is wearing very comfortable clothes at home:

(2) People are arriving here

When the daughter hears her mother's utterance, she wears her clothes. The mother's utterance, through it has the form of a statement, has an illocutionary force of order or recommendation. The mother intends to order her daughter to wear her clothes, but the order is implicit. The mother is indirect in issuing her utterance with the illocutionary force of order. Despite indirectness, the daughter secures the "uptake" and understands that her mother is not simply informing her, but she is

intending something else. To detect this implied intention, the daughter makes use of her mental capacities and refers to her factual background, and precisely to the social conventions that she has about such situations. Both the mother and the daughter share the idea that it is not correct to meet other people/ visitors with some clothes that are inappropriate. The mother's recognition of this social convention allows her to be indirect in issuing the order, the same thing for the daughter who secures "the uptake" thanks to the presence of this idea in her mental background. So, a third basis for "securing the uptake" is related to the social conventions that the speaker and the receiver share.

We notice that most - if not all - cases where "securing the uptake" is invited are related to indirectness. In other words, to secure "the uptake" has to do with cases where messages are issued indirectly. The utterances we are analyzing do not have an imperative form, and are not ambiguous as between an imperative illocutionary force and a non-imperative illocutionary force. Indirectness in communicating messages is due to many factors among which Searle cites politeness in the sense that "*ordinary conversational requirements of politeness normally make it awkward to issue flat imperative sentences...or explicit performatives... indirectives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness*" (Searle 1979, p36). The social connections between participants force them to address each other in different ways: either politely, impolitely or cruelly. The hearer's recognition of his social position allows him to secure "the uptake" and understand the indirect illocutionary act performed by way of a mere statement as (3) below:

(3) I have not visited my family for a long time

The hearer of (3) understands that the speaker is politely making a request to go and visit his family. Politeness is a motivation for the speaker to send the message indirectly, and for the hearer to secure the "uptake" and perform the illocutionary act that has been issued. Brown and Levinson (1987, p57) observe, "*one recognizes what people are doing in verbal exchange (e.g. requesting, offering, criticizing, complaining, suggesting) not so much by fine linguistic detail of their utterance*". Therefore, if (4) is said by a guest:

(4) A terrible wind is passing through this window.

It will be understood by the hearer as a request to shut the window. The host secures "the uptake" by recognizing the guest's position and the fact that he does not like to ask the host to do something thanks to his politeness. Brown and Levinson discuss indirectness in requests and claims that "*when formulating a small request, one will tend to use language that stresses in group membership and social similarity (as in the inclusive "we" of let's have another cookie...). When making a request that is somewhat bigger, one uses the language of formal politeness... And finally, when one tends to use indirect expressions (implicatures)*" (1987, p57)

These three types of request can be exemplified, respectively, as follows:

- (5) Let's pass this night in my house.
- (6) I am sorry to disturb you, but I wonder if you will explain this to me.
- (7) I wonder if anybody would lend me his car.

All these are examples of requests issued indirectly according to the degree of request and the target audience whom the request is directed to. The chief motivation for indirectness is the type of social relations between participants because Brown and Levinson (1987, p61) say that "*in general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of faces. That is, normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained*".

The securing of "uptake" is depending on the hearer's recognition of the degree of politeness he is and he has with the participant. The hearer understands that the speaker is requesting, advising, criticizing him directly, hence, politely. The hearer may be convinced, persuaded,... or he will do or stop doing something as a result to this understanding of the illocutionary act being performed.

To sum up, a speaker may communicate his message to a hearer either directly or indirectly. Saying something involves the production of

a locutionary act. In saying something, a speaker performs an illocutionary act. By saying something, a speaker may achieve a perlocutionary act. To secure "the uptake" is to understand that an illocutionary act has been performed. Securing "the uptake" is based on the mutually shared background, including the social conventions, between participants as well as the hearer's mental capacities of making inferences.

3. Securing the uptake on the basis of the perlocutionary effect

We have said that a speaker's utterance is a meaningful locution with an illocutionary force of either request, order, or advice, etc. The speaker addresses an audience who has to decode and understand both the meaning and "meaning of meaning" of the utterance in order to understand the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance. The hearer's response implies that an effect has been achieved by the issuing of the utterance. This effect is known as the perlocutionary effect. However, the hearer sometimes secures "the uptake" and responds to the speaker's utterances. That is, the locutionary act achieves an effect on the hearer who translates this effect into an action. This second type of effect is called "the illocutionary effect". What may still appear ambiguous is the difference between "the illocutionary" effect and "the perlocutionary effect".

In fact, the distinction between "the illocutionary effect" and "the perlocutionary effect" is related to the distinction between the ways and the means that are used to perform the act. Linguistic communication, as observes El-Hakkouni is "**Goal based**" (1995, p135), in the sense that the speaker intends to achieve some effect on the senses and feelings of the hearer. That is, there is another act **C** (a,b) in addition to act **A** and act **B** that an utterance may produce when issued by a speaker. This third act **C** represents the consequential effects of the first and second acts (**A-B**); these consequential effects of an utterance may be performed "**with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them**" (Austin 1962, p101). Therefore, achieving an effect is intentional; the speaker intends to achieve an effect on the hearer, but in different ways. Take for instance (1) below:

(1) I order you to go out!

The speaker may succeed in getting his addressee out of the place. The verb *succeed* "**presupposes that it is X's (the speaker's) intention to bring about this particular effect**" (Lyons 1977, p732).

We notice that (1) is an explicit performative; it has one and only one particular illocutionary force (that of order). It is a direct speech act, and the utterance has an imperative form whose meaning is specific.

Consider another example (2)

(2) It is a very interesting film.

(2) is not simply a statement of fact. If we consider the context where it is said we will understand that it is a performative whose:

- Act A (locution) is "It is a very interesting film".
- Act B (illocution) is "S" urged or advised "H" to watch the film.
- Act C (perlocution) is: a /"S" persuaded "H" to watch the film.

b /"S" got "H" (or made him) watch the film

We notice that the illocutionary force of (2) is ambiguous. It cannot be made explicit as in (3).

(3) I (hereby) persuade you to watch the film.

But the hearer, whether persuaded to watch the film or not, secures "the uptake" and understands that the speaker is attempting to persuade him to watch the film. The hearer's response implies that an effect is achieved on him. Therefore, both the speaker of (2) and the speaker of (3) have intentions; they have a particular "goal" behind issuing their utterances. In the former, the speaker intends to order the hearer, while in the latter; the speaker intends to persuade the hearer to do something. The only difference is that the speaker's intention can be made explicit when he orders, but cannot be explicit when he persuades. In this respect, Austin (1962, p103) says that "**speaking of the use of "language" for arguing or warning looks just like speaking of the use of "language" for persuading, rousing, alarming; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not**". The same thing applies to examples (2) and (3) above in the sense

that the former is conventional but the latter is non-conventional, on this basis the effect performed by (2) is a "perlocutionary effect" while (3) performs the "illocutionary effect" Therefore, illocutionary effects are non-conventional "*in the sense that they can be explicated solely in terms of so-called natural responses involving beliefs and the recognition of communicative intentions*" (Lyons 1977, p732).

Searle's account to this dilemma is based on the assumption that some performatives have more than one illocutionary force (at least two); one is "incidental" the other is "actual"
Given an example (4)

(4) Do you have a watch?

This utterance has two illocutionary forces: it is incidentally meant as a question, but it is actually meant as a request to tell the hearer what time it is. Therefore, the speaker requests the hearer to tell him the time by means of asking a question. It is a case of indirect speech act wherein the speaker's intended meaning is implied. Receiving (4), the hearer may reply (5).

(5) It is half past six

Hence, we can claim that the hearer has undergone a certain effect and has secured the "uptake". He has understood (4) not as a mere question, but as a request. This effect is non-conventional and "illocutionary" in essence. (4) achieves an "illocutionary effect" on the hearer; which is distinct from the "perlocutionary effect" because it is not direct and explicit.

In Searle's framework cited above, El-Hakkouni (1995) observes that, the emphasis is on the illocutionary effect of utterances while the speaker's intended perlocutionary effect is overlooked and regarded as irrelevant to linguistic communication.

To sum up, the difference between the "illocutionary effect" and the "perlocutionary effect" is dependent on the nature of the speech act in question. In direct speech acts, the speaker performs an illocutionary act which can be made explicit and which achieves a set of consequential

effects on the hearer. This effect is a perlocutionary one. In contrast, in indirect speech acts, the speaker utters sentences which have more than one illocutionary force. The speaker's intended illocutionary act is indirectly and non-conventionally performed by the performing of another direct and explicit illocutionary act. In this case, the hearer has to secure "the uptake" in order to understand the primary meaning of the utterance. The hearer's response implies - as we have said earlier - that he has undergone an effect; which is an "illocutionary effect" because it is indirect and non-conventional.

Conclusion

It is true that Austin's theory of speech acts has enlightened many aspects in the field of pragmatics. Austin raised many important issues of great interest to the understanding of the importance of context in determining the meaning of utterances.

As far as "uptake" is concerned, it is one of these major issues that have not been investigated as much as required. For this reason, working on an issue as that of "uptake" creates many difficulties on the top of which we can mention the rareness of references in the field.

This article may be considered a modest contribution to the understanding of the meaning of "uptake", and an attempt to define it. We have attempted to raise some important issues related to the concept "uptake", "to be quick on the uptake", and to secure "the uptake". The main points of this study can be summarized as follows:

i- "uptake" is a term used to refer to "understanding". It is not the understanding of what is obvious and overtly issued "to secure the uptake" means" to succeed in understanding something that cannot be easily recognized".

ii- "securing the uptake" has been used to explain the fact that a speaker may sometimes be indirect in issuing an illocutionary act and the hearer understands that an illocutionary act, with a certain illocutionary force, has been performed. As a consequence, the hearer says/does

something as a response to what has been said/performed. Therefore, we say that the hearer has secured "the uptake".

iii- "Securing the uptake" implies that an effect has been indirectly achieved - on the part of the speaker - on the senses and feelings of the hearer. That effect is not a perlocutionary effect, it is an effect achieved by the illocutionary act. Though effect is a characteristic of the perlocutionary act, the illocutionary act also achieves an effect on the hearer who secures "the uptake" in order to understand the speakers intended "goal".

iv- "Securing the uptake" is a faculty of the mind which is related to the ability of the hearer to make inferences out of utterances that are issued indirectly. The ability of inferring is due to the hearer's intelligence as well as the background that he shares with his audience.

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